The Transnational Sanctuary of Internal Paralysis: Procedural Overload, Federal Fragmentation, and the Immobilised Capable Guardian in Pakistan’s Counter-Narcotics Regime

Abstract

The present research study undertakes a critical examination and attempts to an in-depth analysis that has been observed in Pakistan’s counter-narcotics legal regime failure. The main concern of this paper is thus on the domestic institutional dysfunction of Pakistan. The dysfunction is in a state that has been singled out as a key north-south conduit for opiates and synthetic narcotics. But the study questions the explanatory power of exogenous geopolitical causes of the dysfunction. It has also tried to answer one of the main paradoxes surrounding the existence of severe and punitive laws and ongoing, large-scale trafficking. The researcher analysed around 14 expert responses from interviews that were taken. Issues of fragmented governance, inter-agency coordination failures and resource limitations stood out as key themes. A porous border with Afghanistan and coordination challenges among agencies were often mentioned by respondents as significant challenges. Many commented that although there are new provincial laws (e.g. Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Act, 2019 Sindh Act 2024, and Punjab Act 2025) which address synthetic drugs, the fragmented authority (federal Control of Narcotic Substances Act (CNSA) 1997 vs. provincial Acts) and limited capacity of enforcement are challenges. There are different roles of the institutions, Pakistan Anti Narcotics Force (ANF) has quality training and few manpower, police and excise have wide reach but low technical capacity. Issues with investigation and prosecution (such as evidence chain problems, judicial bias on seizures) were also mentioned. On the demand side, only a few mentions and very few emphases of rehabilitation and/or awareness programs. The results of the study show a structural paradox at the heart of the notion of the “Capable Guardian.” This paradox is visible in Pakistan in the presence of an advanced punishment law system, namely the Federal Control of Narcotic Substances Act (CNSA), 1997. While this legal framework may seem robust, its true implementation has been rather insufficient at several key points. This institutional paralysis stems from what could be called the “Legal Rigor Paradox.” The elements of procedural safeguards are elements of a relatively well-developed legal system, but the mechanisms for enforcement are not strong and durable. The study also documents a process of “jurisdictional cacophony” which is increasingly occurring due to fragmentation of institutional and administrative systems. Pakistan’s 18th Constitutional Amendment, 2010 devolving most of the legislative responsibilities and powers to the provincial units is an opportunity and challenge in itself. As an opportunity the amendment has empowered the provinces but as challenge it has created a wider gulf between center and provinces in conceptualising legislation, and the ideological and political differences between ruling political parties. This has also created a continuous rift between the federal and provincial authorities asserting powers and jurisdictions.